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Abstract
The international community recognizes the rise in theft and illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and
radioactive sources—for malicious use and nuclear terrorism—as a serious threat. That is why a welldeveloped nuclear forensics capability is an integral part of a robust nuclear security program and a key
element of nuclear security infrastructure. Both pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics are vital for
controlling theft and illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, as well as identifying and tracing their sources.
Nuclear forensics analysis and interpretation processes for nuclear security is a systematic process that
includes: (1) sample collection and categorization techniques and (2) detailed nuclear forensics analytical
plans, which are a laboratory analysis of physical and chemical properties of the collected or seized
nuclear and radioactive materials. Besides nuclear materials, the non-nuclear and biological materials
present in seized nuclear materials can also provide important information about the source and origin of
nuclear materials. Upon complete analysis of the seized materials, the data interpretation to trace the
origin of the nuclear and radiological materials is one of the most critical steps to identifying the origin of
the materials, which depends on the availability of similar data to compare. So, each country should have
its own incident register system (IRS) and collaborate with the International Technical Working Group
(ITWG), Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB), and IAEA for data sharing and interpretation.
Keywords: Illicit trafficking, nuclear security, nuclear forensics, pre- and post-detonation forensics,
characterization, interpretation, source tracing

I.

Introduction
A.

Nuclear Forensics for Nuclear Security

The theft and illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radioactive sources for malicious use and nuclear
terrorism is a high priority concern for nuclear security domestically and internationally [1]. As per the
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IAEA database, there were more than 2,477 incidents of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive
materials between 1993 and 2013. Among them, 16 incidents were related to unauthorized possession of
highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (Pu) [2]. The increase in illicit nuclear trafficking was
recognized as a significant nuclear security threat by the international community. Consequently, they
established nuclear forensic science around the mid-1990s for source attribution of interdicted smuggled
nuclear materials [1, 3]. Source attribution determines the origin or potential trafficking routes of the
materials and their intended use, which improves nuclear materials’ security and physical protection
system at a particular location [4].
The main goal of a nuclear security regime is to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear security events
such as illicit trafficking of nuclear or radioactive materials and nuclear terrorism. Nuclear forensics is a
key technical capability that utilizes signatures inherent to nuclear and radioactive materials to provide
information about pre- and post-detonation events (i.e., the spectrum of nuclear security events under
investigation). It asks the following questions: How, when, and where were the materials made? What
were their intended uses? [1, 5, 6]. Moreover, nuclear forensics is valid scientific evidence to present
before the court of law, which deters illicit nuclear trafficking and nuclear terrorism [5]. The information
obtained from nuclear forensics can respond to nuclear security events and help prevent them [3, 6, 7].
Thus, the role of nuclear forensics is vital in the fight against illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive
materials, their malicious use, and global nuclear terrorism [3].
A well-developed nuclear forensics capability for a civilian nuclear energy program has been recognized
as an important part of a robust nuclear security program and a vital element of a nuclear security
infrastructure [1, 3, 5]. Therefore, one of the major focus areas of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit
(NSS) [8] was to develop the nuclear forensics capability to trace the origin of the interdicted nuclear
materials, identify the smuggling network, and aid in the prosecution of illicit trafficking. Canada has a
civilian nuclear energy program and is one of the world’s largest suppliers of highly radioactive materials
and sealed sources. Hence, Canada decided to enhance its nuclear forensics capability. As per the Canada
commitment for a national nuclear forensics capability at the Seoul 2012 NSS, the Canadian National
Nuclear Forensics Capability Project (CNNFCP) was started in May 2013 to establish a National
Network of Forensics Laboratory (NNFL) and a National Nuclear Forensics Library [1, 8]. For any
country with a civilian nuclear energy program, the nuclear forensics program would be instrumental in
identifying unaddressed deficiencies in nuclear materials accounting, control, and physical protection
systems [6]. The main objectives of this brief review paper are to highlight the importance of nuclear
forensics for national and global nuclear security and discuss the basic steps in nuclear forensics analysis
and interpretation processes to identify the origin of nuclear materials out of regulatory control.

B.

Pre-detonation and Post-detonation Nuclear Forensics for
Nuclear Security

1. Pre-detonation forensics: Pre-detonation forensics, often called “nonproliferation forensics,” focuses on
forensics relevant to interdicted nuclear materials. Pre-detonation forensics works using scientific
information, law enforcement, and intelligence sources to answer the questions raised by a seized nuclear
material; intercepted communication like emails, voice mails, letters, etc.; unusual border activities; and
other nuclear-material–related activities. Pre-detonation nuclear forensics tries to answer: Who left that
nuclear material and why? Do they have a link to other international nuclear smugglers or terrorist
groups? What are the sources of the nuclear material, and when did they get that? How long have those
individuals possessed that nuclear material? What was their supply chain? What are their nationality and
motives? Also, their biological samples (e.g., blood, DNA, and nails) would provide some clues about the
incident [7].
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2. Post-detonation nuclear forensics: This nuclear forensics deals with analyzing and tracing nuclear
materials after a nuclear detonation or after major nuclear accidents such as Chernobyl and Fukushima.
Post-detonation nuclear forensics tries to answer all the pre-detonation events and a few more questions:
What type of device is used? Was it uranium or plutonium or something else? How wide is the fallout
from the events? What are the health implications, and how do we mitigate them? What was the
organization and motive behind the nuclear or radiological attack? If there is any possibility of another
attack, what would be the main target? [7].

II.

Nuclear Forensics Analysis and Interpretation for
Nuclear Security

Nuclear forensics analysis is a systematic process and generally follows the same process, as per the flow
chart prepared by the IAEA (Figure 1) [9]. It is a comprehensive process of analyzing nuclear or other
radioactive materials, which exploits the chemical and physical properties and the isotopic signatures
inherent to nuclear and other radioactive materials to identify the sources, history, and people involved
behind the materials and events [1, 9].

Figure 1. Flow chart of the nuclear forensics analysis process [9]

The response to a specific nuclear incident in both pre- and post-detonation events is a graded approach
and mainly consists of four different steps: (1) Sample collection, (2) categorization, (3) characterization
(i.e., laboratory analyses of the collected samples), and (4) interpretation. A nuclear forensics scientist
develops a hypothesis or set of hypotheses based on archive materials or preliminary analyses and then
characterizes the samples and tests the hypothesis by comparing with the relevant databases and literature,
verifying the presence or absence of signatures. If the signature is absent, a forensic expert either
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abandons the analysis (i.e., the hypothesis must be rejected) or changes the hypothesis and starts the new
analysis process again (Figure 1). However, if the signature is present, additional laboratory analysis may
be required to exclude other possible scenarios and determine the origin of the nuclear materials. Thus,
nuclear forensics analysis and interpretation are deductive and iterative processes [9].

A.

Sample Collection and Categorization Techniques

The sample for nuclear forensics may differ from other regular sample collection techniques for scientific
analysis. Since nuclear forensics samples and sampling procedures are highly versatile, often diverse and
unexpected samples such as gases or aerosols, dust particles, biological materials, large metal pieces,
glasses, plastic, and soil are collected from the incident sites [3, 6]. During sampling, it may be necessary
to collect as many samples as possible using a safe handling technique and a proper sample collection
protocol [3]. Nuclear forensic science applies scientific knowledge to legal problems [3]. If the samples
are collected from the illicitly trafficked nuclear material, the chain of custody must be maintained to
ensure data quality and reliability for the legal prosecution [6, 9]. We should remember that sample
collection may have legal and practical restrictions and limitations. Immediately after sample collection,
the collected or seized samples are analyzed in the incident sites and undergo a preliminary analysis
called categorization.
The categorization process has two goals: First, one must perform a quick and rough on-scene assessment
of the material using, mainly, nuclear radiation measurement equipment and a non-destructive analysis
(NDA) technique (i.e., gamma-ray spectroscopy) to determine the health risk of the seized materials to the
first responders, law enforcement personnel, and local population. Also, this process determines the
nature of incidents like criminal activity or accidental release. If it involves criminal activity or threats to
national security, one must decide on additional steps to take [9]. Second, one must categorize the
interdicted smuggled nuclear materials to assess the threat using NDA techniques such as neutron
counting or gamma (γ) spectroscopy, determining the extent of environmental contamination and nuclear
proliferation issues.

B.

Nuclear Forensic Analytical Plans

Nuclear forensic analytical plans are a laboratory analysis of the physical and chemical properties of the
collected or seized nuclear and radioactive materials. It involves the full analysis of nuclear or other
radioactive materials to identify some basic parameters or “signatures” like the isotopic composition of
uranium (U), plutonium (Pu), and other stable elements (i.e., elemental analysis); the age of the nuclear
materials (i.e., radiochronometry); chemical impurities (i.e., trace elements); and organic impurities,
macroscopic parameters, and microstructure and physical dimensions to get some clues on the origin and
intended use of the materials (Figure 2) [2, 4, 5]. Nuclear forensic analysis for both nuclear and nonnuclear materials should be done using a model action plan for nuclear forensic analysis (Figure 2).
Various physical and analytical chemistry techniques such as visual inspection, optical microscopy,
scanning electron microscopy, X-ray spectroscopy, X-ray fluorescence analysis, X-ray diffraction
analysis (XRD), Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy, radioactive counting techniques, chemical
assay, radiochemistry, radiography, mass spectrometry (MS), inductively coupled plasma mass
spectrometry (ICP-MS), gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS), secondary ion mass
spectrometry (SIMS), etc. are used to characterize the nuclear and radiological materials.
However, a single parameter (signature) and a single analytical technique may not be sufficient to discern
the identity and origin of the interdicted nuclear materials. Therefore, the multiple parameters or
signatures and the analytical techniques would be used to ascertain the source of the nuclear materials,
which eventually supports the precise interpretation [2, 4, 5]. The steps for nuclear materials
characterization are a bit shorter than the complete interpretation steps. To ensure nuclear security, it is a
state’s responsibility to set up a nuclear forensics laboratory with complete characterization capabilities or
collaborate with another country for sample characterization and interpretation [3].
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Figure 2. A model action plan for nuclear forensic analysis [10]

Nuclear forensic science uses various analytical tools and techniques to detect nuclear and radioactive
materials (Table 1). The international nuclear forensics community met with the Nuclear Forensics
International Technical Working Group (ITWG) and has achieved consensus on the proper sequencing of
analytical techniques (Table 1) to provide invaluable nuclear forensics information as early as possible in
the attribution process. The ITWG and IAEA recommend that scientists analyze the nuclear materials
having short half-lives and sensitivity to environmental degradation (i.e., HEU residue) within the first 24
hours of interdiction. Non-destructive analysis (NDA) techniques should be used in the first analysis (24
hours) so that the same sample can be used in the subsequent analyses.
Table 1 shows a generally accepted sequence of analysis of nuclear materials after interdiction. The table
also provides information about the analytical techniques commonly used within the first 24 hours, after
one week, and after two weeks of receiving the sample in nuclear forensics analyses and investigations [9,
11].
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Table 1. Laboratory methods and techniques with typical timescales for analyses [3]
Technique/method Conducted within
24 hours
Radiological
Dose rate (α, β, γ, n)
Surface contamination
Radiography
Physical
Visual inspection
Characterization
Photography
Weight determination
Dimensional
determination
Optical microscopy
Density
Isotope analysis
High-resolution gammaray spectrometry
(HRGRS)

Radiochronometry

High-resolution gammaray spectrometry
(HRGRS) for Pu

Elemental/chemical
composition

X-ray fluorescence

Traditional forensic
analysis

Collection of evidence
associated with traditional
forensics such as blood,
fingerprint, insects,
plastic, etc.

Conducted within
One week

Conducted within
Two months

Microstructure,
Morphology and
other physical
characteristics
Scanning electron
microscope (SEM)
X-ray diffraction
Thermal ionization
mass spectrometry
(TIMS)
Inductively coupled
plasma mass
spectrometry (ICPMS)
Thermal ionization
mass spectrometry
(TIMS)
Inductively coupled
plasma mass
spectrometry (ICPMS)
Inductively coupled
plasma mass
spectrometry (ICPMS)
Chemical assay
Fourier transform
infrared (FTIR)
X-ray spectrometry
Isotope dilution mass
spectrometry (IDMS)

Nanostructure,
Morphology and other
physical characteristics
Transmission electron
microscopy (TEM)

Secondary ion mass
spectrometry (SIMS)
Radioactive counting
techniques (α and γ
spectrometry)

High-resolution
gamma-ray
spectrometry (HRGRS)
for U
α spectrometry
Gas chromatographymass spectrometry

Analysis and
interpretation of
evidence associated
with traditional
forensics
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III. Characteristic Parameters
The characteristic parameters or “signatures” found in nuclear materials reveal the origin of the materials
[4]. Analyzing seized nuclear materials for nuclear forensics can be performed in any materials
characterization laboratory. However, a specialized facility for testing a radioactive sample with a highly
skilled technician is found only in designated nuclear forensics laboratories and nuclear research
laboratories. Nuclear forensics technicians need special precautions to handle and analyze nuclear or
radioactive samples. They also need radiation safety training, protective gear, and personal protective
equipment (PPE).
Once a lab receives the seized materials, the analyses are performed using the nuclear forensic
examination plan (Figure 1) and the nuclear forensics analytical plan (Figure 2 and Table 1). The
designated lab should have a well-developed analytical facility and operational procedures designed to
minimize cross-contamination during the analysis. A combination of the analytical techniques is used to
ensure data accuracy to determine their signatures. Furthermore, the results of nuclear forensics would be
the legal prosecution. In addition, the results reflect the national and regional security and possible
military retaliation against criminals.
Therefore, the characterization of the seized nuclear materials must be done carefully and in a welldocumented manner. This includes the cross-calibration analysis (QA/QC), a choice of specific and highpurity reference materials, and demonstrated competencies in the analysis. Also, if possible, the analysis
of the same materials must be done in multiple labs and must compare the data to ensure accuracy [7].
The following types of nuclear forensics “signatures” are generally used to answer the questions of a law
enforcement agency and during the legal prosecution in national and international courts.

A.

Physical Characterization

In a nuclear forensics examination, the physical dimension (i.e., diameter, height, and weight) analysis
technique is one of the first to characterize the nuclear materials. The reason is that the seized nuclear
materials’ size and shape can provide essential clues about the materials’ origin and transportation routes.
This technique is instrumental in identifying the nuclear fuel pellets. The nuclear reactor’s fuel pellets are
made by compacting uranium dioxide (UO2) powder; some reactors use enriched uranium, and some use
natural uranium pellets as fuel.
The fuel pellets’ shape, size, enrichment levels, and structure vary by reactor type. For example, the
dimensions of Heavy Water Reactor (HWR) and Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel pellets are
different. Some reactors pellets have a central hole that provides space for gaseous fission products during
irradiation processes. Those characteristics are observed in a nuclear forensics analysis to find the
material’s origin and history. For instance, in 2003, four uranium fuel pellets seized in Lithuania were
analyzed at the Institute for Transmutation Elements (ITU), Karlsruhe, Germany. The fuel pellets were
cylindrical with a central hole and one concave face. Based on the physical dimensions and enrichment
levels, a nuclear forensics technician identified that the uranium fuel pellets were from an RBMK – 1500
nuclear reactor (i.e., graphite-moderated, water-cooled Russian nuclear reactor) [2].

B.

Radiochronometry (Nuclear Archeology)

In nuclear forensics, when the nuclear materials are purified or enriched and subsequently analyzed, it is
called its age [4, 12]. The shape, size, and age of uranium pellets and other nuclear materials and their
enrichment levels and isotopic ratios indicate the origin and history of nuclear materials of historical
interest. This branch of nuclear forensics is called radiochronometry or nuclear archeology. These
signatures are useful for identifying the age and type of nuclear materials of historical interest. For
instance, an old glass jug was recovered from the waste trench at the Hanford site in Washington State,
USA. And the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) researchers used radiation counting
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techniques (i.e., gamma spectroscopy and alpha spectroscopy)—and other precise mass spectrometric
techniques like Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS), Gas Chromatography-Mass
Spectrometry (GC-MS), and Ion Chromatography (IC)—to identify the origin and age of the nuclear
material. For age determination, first, they separated the 235U and 239Pu using Ion Exchange
Chromatography (IEC) and then analyzed the isotopic ratios using ICP-MS. 239Pu and 235U are not stable
isotopes. 235U is formed through the decay of 239Pu, the half-life of which is 24,110 years.
On the other hand, the half-life of 235U is extremely long (704 × 106 years), and the long half-life of 235U
and the subsequent decay of 235U can be ignored for the radiochronometric analysis [7]. It is assumed that
the separation of 235U and 239Pu was complete using Ion Exchange Chromatography (IEC). The time since
the last separation is calculated by

𝑁(235𝑈 )
≈ 𝜆239
𝑁(239𝑃𝑢 )
The time (t) since the separation is given by

𝑡1
𝑁(235𝑈 )
𝑁(235𝑈 )
𝑡 ≈ 2
≈ 3.478 × 𝑥104
𝑙𝑛2𝑁(239𝑃𝑢 )
𝑙𝑛2𝑁(239𝑃𝑢 )
Other isotopes ratios used for determining the age of uranium materials are 235U/231Pa and 234U/230Th [7].
From the above time (t) calculation, it was revealed that the sample was 61.6 ± 4.5 years old. They
compared the database after the isotopic analysis. They found that the plutonium (Pu) composition was
similar to the plutonium (Pu) prepared at the X-10 reactor in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which was brought to
the Hanford T-Plant site for separation. The T-Plant was the world’s first industrial-scale Pu reprocessing
facility, where the first human-made Pu was separated, and the recovered Pu was the oldest human-made
Pu in the world. At the same time, the trace element impurities in the sample were similar to the bismuth
phosphate process used at that time to extract Pu from the irradiated uranium. The age of Pu, isotopic
composition, and trace element impurities provided sufficient information to determine the origin of the
materials in the bottle [2, 13].

C.

Uranium Isotope Ratios

Uranium ore is mined and milled to produce Uranium Ore Concentrates (UOCs), often called yellowcake.
UOCs have a natural isotopic abundance of 235U (0.72%), 238U (99.2%), and 234U (about 53 – 55ppm) [2].
However, the terrestrial 235U/238U ratio varies over a range of 1.3% in different geologic materials [14,
15]. Therefore, the 235U/238U signatures in the UOCs from each site (i.e., geologic environments) or region
are distinct. When all three isotopic ratios are considered, no two samples have the same isotopic
composition [14, 15].
These regional isotopic variations are utilized as a possible forensics signature for nuclear materials. For
instance, the three isotopic ratios (238U, 235U, and 234U) of UOCs from Canada have more distinct
signatures than the UOCs from Australia and the Middle East [14, 15]. So, if the interdicted nuclear
materials’ (UOCs) isotopic ratios are analyzed and compared with the international databases or nuclear
forensics libraries, the origin of the material can easily be identified. For instance, two
(K2(UO2)3O4·4H2O and UO3·2H2O) power samples (42.9 g of bright yellow and 48.6 g of dark green
powder) were seized in Australia, Victoria, by police and analyzed at the Australian National Science and
Technology Organization (ANSTO) for the possible compositions of nuclear isotopes. The 235U isotopic
ratio was found to be 0.44% and 0.41%, respectively, and the materials also contained 232U and 236U
isotopes. However, the 232U and 236U isotopes can be formed by only neutron irradiation in a nuclear
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reactor, and Australia did not have a nuclear reactor at that time. As a result, nuclear forensics researchers
concluded that the interdicted materials were from out of the country [2, 16, 17].

D.

Micro-signatures

The morphological study (e.g., grain size and porosity) was conducted on the two uranium (U) power
samples (42.9 g of bright yellow and 48.6 g of dark green powder) seized in Victoria, Australia [16]. In a
scanning electron microscope study, these two samples’ grain size and porosity were entirely different.
The samples’ microstructures depend on the material processing methods, uranium mills, and
geographical locations. From these materials’ micro-signatures, nuclear forensics researchers determined
that those nuclear materials were not only from outside the country but also from two different sources. In
addition, they used nanoscale secondary ion mass spectrometry (nanoSIMS) and radiochronometry to
ensure the origin of the two seized nuclear materials [2, 5, 17].

E.

Trace Element Impurities or Rare Earth Elements

Trace elemental impurities or presence of Rare Earth Elements (REEs) in nuclear materials, or UOCs are
source inherited. These elements’ concentrations change little during the nuclear fuel cycles. Therefore,
these elemental impurities or REEs have proved helpful as the nuclear forensics signatures for several
seized nuclear materials. Each country’s REEs signature is distinct; thus, the seized nuclear materials are
analyzed to determine the origin of the nuclear materials. For example, Canada, the USA, Spain, Turkey,
and Kazakhstan have distinct REEs signatures. For instance, nuclear forensics scientists analyzed the
235
U/238U signature to determine the origin of the material (3 kg of radioactive wet brownish-yellow
powder) discovered in a scrap metal shipment in Rotterdam Harbor, the Netherlands, in 2003. However,
they could not find any database to interpret their data to determine the origin of the material. As an
alternative to this method, they analyzed the trace elemental impurities (Al, Ca, Cr, Fe, Mg, Mo, Ni, and
P) in the nuclear material and compared them with the international databases. Finally, the elemental
impurities signatures identified that the material originated from the Middle East [5, 18].

F.

Sealed Radioactive Sources

Orphan radioactive sources and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control are a huge problem
for nuclear security. After all, terrorists can use radioactive materials from those sources to make a
Radioactive Dispersal Device (RDD)—a “dirty bomb” [19]. The signatures used to determine the origin
of nuclear materials can also be utilized to trace the sources of radioactive materials. Initially, a nondestructive analysis technique, such as gamma (γ) spectroscopy, can be used to identify the origin of the
radioactive sources. As explained in “uranium isotope ratios” (Section 3C), the mass spectrometry
techniques are used to determine the isotopic and elemental compositions. That information can be used
to determine the age and origin of radioactive sources. Besides elemental composition and isotopic ratios,
a device serial number, logo, and detail specification sheet are used to compare these data with the source
licensing database [2]. To identify the origin of sealed radioactive sources, each country has its own
incident register system (IRS). For instance, Canada has the Sealed Source Tracking System (SSTS), an
electronic add-on to the National Sealed Source Registry (NSSR), which provides licensees a more
convenient and efficient way to report any movement of sealed sources [20]. CNSC also publicly reports
lost and stolen sources, where the lost and found sealed radioactive sources are up to date [21]. Similarly,
Australia has the Australian Radiation Incident Register (ARIR), where information about the
missing/stolen and found radioactive sources are available [22]. These incident registers are vital for
controlling and tracing radioactive sources out of regulatory control. Each country should register the lost
or stolen sealed radioactive sources in the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) and work with the
ITWG and IAEA to identify the missed or stolen radioactive sources [2].
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G.

Traditional Forensic Evidence

Nuclear forensics focuses not only on the analysis of the nuclear materials but also on the biological
materials contaminated with radionuclides or the biological materials found along with the interdicted
smuggled nuclear materials. The materials that interest nuclear forensics scientists are DNA, blood,
fingerprints, electronic devices, fibers, insects, etc. Despite the high ionization radiation (IR) exposure,
these materials still have forensics values and should be examined during the nuclear forensics
examination and source determination step. For instance, in the two-uranium powder K2 (UO2)3O4·4H2O
and UO3·2H2O) samples seized in Australia, Victoria, one sample had a moth body and a detached head
along with the samples [16]. The moth species was studied by entomologists and revealed that the moth
species were from outside the country. Thus, the biological samples and nuclear materials are essential for
determining the source of interdicted nuclear materials [5] and for nuclear security.

H.

Non-nuclear Materials for Nuclear Forensics

In 1997, a scrap metal piece with some radioactivity was found in Germany. Their preliminary analysis
revealed that the traces of fission products (i.e., UO2 particles) were attached with the metal piece. The
elemental analysis (i.e., characterization) found that the metal was stainless steel, which originated from
Eastern Europe or Russia. The physical dimension of the stainless steel matched with the upper and
middle parts of the fuel assembly of the BN-600 reactor and a BR-10 research reactor [2]. Similarly, other
non-nuclear materials seized along with the nuclear materials help determine their origin, history, and
trafficking routes.

IV. Data Interpretation and Attribution
As per the nuclear forensics examination plan (Figure 1), data interpretation is next once the nuclear
materials analysis is complete. The data interpretation to trace the origin of nuclear and radiological
materials depends on the availability of similar data. Thus, data interpretation is lengthy and complicated
in a nuclear forensics examination plan.
There are several steps for data interpretation and source attribution. First, data quality is paramount. High
data quality can be achieved through a well-equipped lab, highly skilled technicians, high-quality
assurance, and quality control (QA/QC) procedures, as well as a high purity reference material, to check
the instrument’s accuracy, precision, and reproducibility. Second, data interpretation involves correlating
analytical data or comparing similar data within the country and internationally. Therefore, the databases
available for comparison are vital in this process. A national forensics laboratory, a national forensics
library, and data sharing among states are instrumental in interpreting the samples. Third, open and closed
literature can also be used for data comparison and interpretation. Fourth, each country with a civilian
nuclear power program should set up a national forensics laboratory, associated databases of nuclear fuel
cycle processes, and a forensics library of all the materials used, produced, stored, and imported from
another country. Also, each country should have its own incident register system (IRS) and collaborate
with the nuclear forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), Incident and Trafficking
Database (ITDB), and IAEA for data sharing and interpretation. Fifth, interpreting and attributing the
nuclear materials out of regulatory control, if available, uses multiple nuclear signatures to ensure the
accuracy of the origin, history, and trafficking routes of the illicitly trafficked nuclear materials. Sixth,
one must use a combination of forensics techniques to analyze the nuclear materials for nuclear
attribution and interpretation. Finally, data interpretation should be done using a deductive and iterative
process, as each successive comparison may provide more precise information about the nuclear materials
[3].
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V.

Conclusions

The illicit trafficking of nuclear materials is one of the most severe threats to global nuclear security and
stability. The international community recognized that nuclear forensics could effectively determine the
origin of detected nuclear and radioactive materials and control illicit nuclear trafficking and nuclear
terrorism. Nuclear forensics science utilizes the unique signatures (i.e., physical properties, isotopic ratios,
radiochronometry, trace elemental impurities, and traditional forensics) present in the nuclear and
radiological materials to determine their origin, history, and transportation routes. Consequently, it was
recognized as one of the essential components of nuclear security and safeguards.
However, to take full advantage of nuclear forensics—in the fight against nuclear smuggling and
terrorism—one must consider its requirements. It calls for a robust nuclear forensics capability, highquality data from a well-equipped laboratory, relevant databases or a nuclear forensics library, specialized
skills and knowledge to interpret the data, and international cooperation in technology and human
resource development. Since nuclear forensics is based on scientific evidence and facts, the final data
obtained from the nuclear forensics analyses are valid before a national and international court of law for
legal prosecution. To this end, it deters illicit nuclear trafficking and nuclear terrorism. That is why it is
one of the most important nuclear security and safeguards tools.
Additionally, a well-developed nuclear forensics program is an integral part of a robust nuclear security
regime for a civilian nuclear energy program and a vital element of a country’s nuclear security
infrastructure. Based on nuclear incidents, pre- and post-detonation forensics analyses are used for
determining the source of the nuclear materials for legal prosecution. In pre- and post-detonation nuclear
forensics, nuclear forensics scientists, a law enforcement agency, and the national intelligence agency
collaborate to answer questions related to the origin, history, impacts on human health and the
environment, and other national nuclear security threats from terrorists and criminals.
Most nuclear or radiological materials contain multiple signatures. Sometimes a single nuclear signature
is enough to ascertain the source of the illicit nuclear or radioactive materials. Sometimes, various nuclear
signatures are necessary to determine the exact source of the nuclear materials out of regulatory control.
However, nuclear signatures of the interdicted nuclear materials are helpful to determine the origin and
history of the materials only if the databases (i.e., signatures) are available for comparison and
interpretation. Therefore, one of the critical parts of nuclear forensics examination is the data available for
comparing the nuclear forensics lab data with the national and international databases. That is why
effective nuclear forensics relies on cooperation between national and international partners for data
sharing and interpretation. In addition, a complete nuclear forensics analysis involves, of course, the
analysis (i.e., both physical and chemical) of the nuclear or radioactive materials, as well as any biological
or non-nuclear materials contaminated with radionuclides (i.e., traditional forensics). This process
determines the sources and history of nuclear materials. Most importantly, nuclear forensics is the key to
identifying weaknesses in a physical protection system and nuclear material accounting. Once identified,
these weaknesses can be corrected by taking the necessary measures. Therefore, nuclear forensics can be
an integral part of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards and can be applied to reduce the illicit
trafficking of nuclear materials.
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